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NOTES
Rationalizing Administrative Searches
In announcing the decision of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. last
year, 1 the Supreme Court laid another brick in the skewed edifice
of administrative searches under the fourth amendment. By a
five to three vote, 2 the Court held that warrantless, nonconsensual inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 19703 (OSHA) violate the fourth amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 In requiring that an OSHA
inspector obtain a warrant, the Court noted that "[p ]robable
cause in the criminal law sense is not required. " 5 Instead, it reiterated the doctrine of Camara v. Municipal Court 6 and See v.
City of Seattle7 that a lesser showing of suspected reason for a
search, here referred to as administrative probable cause, satisfies
the warrant requirement for searches by regulatory bodies.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not consistently approached the fundamental problems that administrative searches
present. In first confronting the issue, the Court held that administrative searches required no warrants at all. 8 Eight years later,
Camara and See overruled that decision, and for a fragile instant
the law seemed deceptively clear. But then, in the early 1970s, the
Court resurrected some of the old arguments against search warrants and established an exception to the administrative probable cause requirement. 0 Now, Barlow's takes us back the other
way, limiting the exception and restoring the Camara-See rule to
1. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
2. Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision.
3. 29
§§ 651-678 (1976).
4. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
5. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
6. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
8. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
9. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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1291

...

1292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1291

preeminence in fourth amendment jurisprudence.
The Court's inconsistent reasoning in this case stems from
the dilemma that administrative search warrants present: how to
extend fourth amendment protections to subjects of administrative searches while preserving the effectiveness of administrative
inspections. 10 Its attempts to resolve the problem have been so
riddled with exceptions that no simple rule can explain them all.
Not surprisingly, they have provoked a wealth of legal commentary and criticism. 11
At the outset, this Note examines the major decisions concerning administrative searches. Specifically, it traces the development of a warrant requirement and of the corresponding lower
standard of probable cause announced in the Camara and See
decisions. Subsequent modifications of that seemingly absolute
rule are then analyzed. To develop a framework for evaluating
administrative search cases, Section II groups those principal
Supreme Court cases, along with pertinent lower court opinions,
into three tiers of fourth amendment protection: administrative
10·. Although the same problem afflicts almost all administrative searches, it is particularly acute in the case of municipal housing code violations:
The basic flaw in the fourth amendment approach is that the established standard
of probable cause required for the issuance of a warrant would have to be greatly
diluted to accommodate the municipal need - particularly in nascent or existing
slum areas - for general periodic inspections ..•• Were a showing or'probable
cause, in the traditional sense, required to secure authorization for these inspections, municipal health and housing authorities would necessarily have to wait until
it might well be too late to prevent a health hazard from causing disease or a
neighborhood from becoming a slum. Relaxation of the standard of probable cause
would be compelled by the need to avoid these consequences. But once the standard
were relaxed, the routine issuance of warrants would compromise any effective
protection against improper searches and perhaps undermine the existing practice
of delaying searches at the request of the individual homeowner.
Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment - A Rationale, 65 COLUM,
L. REV. 288, 291 (1965) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Administrative
Inspections].
11. See, e.g., Greenberg, The Balance of Interests and the Fourth Amendment: A
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV, 1011
(1973); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and
See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT, REV. 1; McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative
Inspections: Is There Any Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U. L. REV, 942 (1977);
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975); Note, Administrative Searches and the
Implied Consent Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Fourth Amendment]; Administrative Inspections, supra note 10; Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches Under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
OSHA Searches]; Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MlNN. L. REV. 607 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Administrative Search Warrants].
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searches that require a warrant based on a traditional criminal
standard of probable cause; administrative searches that require
a warrant based on administrative probable cause; and administrative searches that require no warrant at all. It critically assesses the theory courts have used to determine what degree of
protection the subject of a search deserves.
The Note concludes by suggesting that courts implicitly have
recognized a distinction between commercial property and private dwellings 12 in deciding whether to apply the traditional probable cause test or the administrative probable cause test. 13 It then
recommends a recategorization of searches within the threetiered framework consistent with such a distinction.

I.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES

The Era of Frank v. Maryland: Warrantless Administrative
Inspections

In Frank v. Maryland, 14 the Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of whether the fourth amendment required a city official
enforcing a health and sanitation ordinance to obtain a warrant.
Responding to a complaint that there were rats in the 4300 block
of Reisterstown Road, an inspector of the Baltimore Cit_y Health
Department conducted an investigation. The inspector knocked
on the door of Aaron Frank. Receiving no answer, }J.e inspected
12. Those knowledgeable about first amendment history will find such a distinction
familiar. At one time a "commercial speech" exception existed with respect to the first
amendment, Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951). The exception was widely criticized and was gradually whittled down over the
years, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Commn., 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
until its eventual demise in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Although commercial speech is no longer excepted from first amendment protection,
the degree of first amendment protection afforded commercial speech is still lei;s than that
afforded other forms of speech. See 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy case merely held that commercial speech deserved some degree of first amendment
protection and that therefore the exception should no longer exist. But in the process,
the Court recognized that the public need for the regulation of commercial speech justified a commercial-noncommercial distinction in the first amendment. 425 U.S. at 772. It
is this sort of distinction which is analogous to the one proposed with respect to the fourth
amendment.
13. While the Supreme Court has twice rejected (in See and Barlow's) the argument
that businesses do not deserve the protection of warrants, it has not said that businesses
deserve fourth amendment protection identical to that afforded private dwellings. See See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). Indeed, the Court implied just the opposite
in the See case. See text at note 176 infra.
14. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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the area immediately surrounding the house. He found the house
dilapidated and the surrounding area filled with "approximately
half a ton" of trash and rodent feces. 15 During the inspection,
Frank approached the inspector and asked for an explanation.
The inspector told Frank of his findings and asked permission to
search the basement of Frank's house. Frank refused. The next
day the agent returned with two police officers, and after again
being refused admittance, swore out a warrant for Frank's arrest.16 No search warrant was ever obtained. Appealing his conviction, Frank challenged the validity of the Baltimore city ordinance, 17 asserting that inspection of his home without a warrant
violated the fourth amendment. 18
A deeply divided Court upheld Frank's conviction. 10 The
majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, analyzed the history of the fourth amendment and concluded that the framers
intended the warr;mt requirement to apply only to searches for
criminal evidence, and not to regulatory inspections promoting
"minimum community standards of health and well-being." 20
The Court found that the lack of potential criminal liability from
the search, coupled with the growing need of cities to maintain
minimum standards of housing and sanitation, rendered the warrant requirement superfluous. 21 Since the search was regulatory
15. 359 U.S. at 361.
16. 359 U.S. at 361.
17. Frank was charged with a violation of§ 120 of article 12 of the Baltimore City
Code:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day
time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit
a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars.
Quoted in 359 U.S. at 361.
18. The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
19. Frank v. Maryland was a five-to-four decision.
20. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959).
21. One of the most intriguing facets of the Frank decision is how Justice Frankfurter
stressed the interrelationship between the fourth and fifth amendments:
[T]wo protections emerge from the broad constitutional proscription of official
invasion. The first of these is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy, the right to shut the door on officers of the state unless their entry is under
proper authority of law. The second, and intimately related protection, is selfprotection: the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of the state against the individual,
information which may be used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or
property. Thus, evidence of criminal action may not, save in very limited and
closely confined situations, be seized without a judicially issued search warrant.
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and not criminal (one supposes Frank's arrest and fine, 22 although
punitive, were not "criminal" sanctions), the fourth amendment
did not apply. 23
Justice Douglas, joined by three other dissenting Justices,
vigorously rejected the majority's premise that the fourth amendment was not meant to apply to searches enforcing a noncriminal
regulatory code. 24 For the Frank dissenters the fourth amendment
preserves a citizen's privacy, which may be threatened equally by
an administrative or a criminal search. 25
Just one year after Frank, the Supreme Court again confronted the alleged need for a warrant to perform an administrative search in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price. 26 As in Frank, the
appellant had refused to allow local inspectors to enter his home
without a warrant. Weakly echoing the result in Frank, an evenly
divided Court allowed his conviction to stand. 27 Justice Brennan,
however, submitted a separate opinion and renewed Justice
Douglas's assault upon the distinction between civil and criminal
searches:
The public interest in the cleanliness and adequacy of the dwellings of the people is great. So too is the public interest that the
tools of counterfeiting and the paraphernalia of the illicit narcotics
traffic not remain active. On an adequate and appropriate showing
in particular cases, the privacy of the home must bow before these
interests of the public. But none of these interests provides an open
sesame to those who enforce them. The Fourth Amendment's procedure established the way in which these general public interests
are to be brought into specific focus to require the individual
householder to open his door. 28

Notwithstanding the pointed prose of Douglas and Brennan, it
remained abundantly clear until 1967 that no official performing
359 U.S. at 365. The theory that criminal searches and administrative searches may be
distinguished on the basis of potential criminal liability has received both support and
criticism. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949); LaFave,
supra note 11, at 5; Beyond the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 11; Administrative
Search Warrants, supra note 11, at 612. Although the Court in Camara and See purported
to discard the distinction, traces of it linger today in administrative search cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
22. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362 (1959).
.
23. 359 U.S. at 366.
24. 359 U.S. at 375-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
25. 359 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
27. Justice Stewart took no part in the Eaton case.
28. 364 U.S. at 272-73 (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice, Justice Black, and
Justice Douglas joined Brennan's separate opinion. Not surprisingly, this block was identical to the dissenting faction in Frank.
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a search for health and safety code violations needed to trouble
himself to obtain a search warrant.
B. Camara and See: Warrant Protection for Administrative
Inspections
The companion decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court 20
and See v. City of Seattle 30 vindicated the arguments of the Frp,nk
dissenters. Camara challenged an annual warrantless housing
inspection authorized by the San Francisco Municipal Code. 31
After the appellant three times refused to allow inspectors to
enter his ground floor apartment without a warrant, he was arrested. 32 The state court denied Camara's petition for a writ of
prohibition, but on appeal, the Supreme Court ordered that the
writ be issued, holding that Camara "had a constitutional right
to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search" 33 and that
he "may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent
to the inspection. " 34
In overruling Frank v. Maryland, the majority first attacked
that case's distinction between criminal and civil searches:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even
the most law-ab1ding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may
be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry
under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal
and family security.3li

The Court concluded that in administrative inspections, as in
criminal ones, the fourth amendment requires an independent
29. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
30. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
31. Section 503 of the San Francisco Municipal Code, quoted in 387 U.S. at 526:
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be
necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure,
or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal
Code.
32. Camara was charged with violating § 507 of the Municipal Code, which provided
for a $500 fine or imprisonment for not more than six months. 387 U.S. at 527 n.2.
33. 387 U.S. at 540.
34. 387 U.S. at 540.
35. 387 U.S. at 530-31 (footnote omitted). The Court also pointed out that even if the
civil-criminal distinction were valid, it would frequently be irrelevant, as regulatory
inspections are typically enforced by criminal sanctions such as fines and imprisonment,
387 U.S. at 531.
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magistrate's review before a governmental official may intrude
upon a citizen's privacy: 36 "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant. " 37
Having decided that administrative searches do require warrants, the Court then had to face squarely the dilemma posed at
the outset of this Note: How can regulatory inspection schemes
be adequately enforced if inspectors must always obtain a search
warrant? Such inspections typically are random spot checks, preventive in nature, based upon such factors as "passage of time,
the nature of the building . . . , or the condition of the entire
area, " 38 rather than upon a reasonable belief that any violation
exists.
The Supreme Court's rather innovative solution to this problem was to create a new standard of probable cause for administrative search warrants. Recognizing that periodic inspections are
often the only effective means to gain compliance with the requirements of municipal codes, the Court held that a reasonableness test determines probable cause in an administrative search, 39
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails." 40 In short, "[i]f a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue
36. 387 U.S. at 532-33.
37. 387 U.S. at 528-29. The Court refused to except administrative searches from the
warrant requirement:
We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are
not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk
of a criminal penalty.
387 U.S. at 533. As this passage demonstrates, even though the Court purported to reject
the civil-criminal distinction, it reverted to that distinction to support its arguments. The
distinction appears to be one that refuses to die. It results from an overlap of the fourth
and fifth amendments that apparently exists in the minds of lawyers and judges. See note
111 infra.
38. 387 U.S. at 538.
39. 387 U.S. at 535-36. This test does not appear consistent with the wording of the
fourth amendment. The fourth amendment requires "probable cause" to show that an
otherwise unreasonable search is constitutionally acceptable. The Camara Court took
what had been an independent standard - probable cause - and made it depend on the
reasonableness of the search. The new test is at best circular (a search is reasonable ifthere
is probable cause, and probable cause exists if it is reasonable) and at worst selfcontradictory (an unreasonable search requires probable cause, yet probable cause exists
if the search is reasonable). This seemingly untenable standard is the inconsistency
pointed out by the dissents of Justice Clark in See, 387 U.S. at 546, and Justice Stevens
in Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 325.
40. 387 U.S. at 537.
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a suitably restricted search warrant. " 41
The Supreme Court presented three reasons justifying the
less stringent probable cause requirement for administrative
search warrants. First, the public and the judiciary had long accepted such code enforcement inspections. 42 Second, given the
unconstitutionality of warrantless searches, the new standard
provided the only means of effective enforcement. 43 Finally, such
inspections were "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of crime" and therefore "involved a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." 44
On the same day as Camara, the Court also decided See v.
City of Seattle 45 and extended its new administrative probable
cause standard to commercial inspections. The appellant in See
had refused to allow Seattle fire inspectors to enter his commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to
believe that any violation existed. The Supreme Court reversed
the appellant's conviction under the Seattle Fire Code, 46 holding
that Camara's warrant requirement for administrative inspections protected commercial premises as well as homes. 47
41. 387 U.S. at 539. This flexible probable cause standard starkly contrasts with the
rigid probable cause standard of criminal search warrants. There must be sufficient evidence to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is
in the process of being committed, and that the premises contain legally seizable material.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See text at notes 87-94 infra.
42. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537.
43. 387 U.S. at 537.
44. 387 U.S. at 537. Ironically, the Court, in its effort to support the lower standard
of probable cause for administrative search warrants, adopted practically the same arguments that had been used to justify warrantless inspections in Frank. As a result, several
commentators have questioned whether Camara really offers any significant increase in
fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 11, at 27.
45. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
46. Section 8.01.050 of the Seattle Fire Code, quoted in 387 U.S. at 541:
It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and
premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the
purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause
fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance
concerning fire hazards.
47. The Court expressed this notion twice in the See opinion:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced
by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant,
387 U.S. at 543.
We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be com-
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Together, Camara and See signalled two significant changes
in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment philosophy. First, the
Court recognized the warrant requirement as the primary safeguard of fourth amendment rights. In other words, the reasonableness of a search under the first clause of the fourth amendment depends largely upon whether the warrant requirement in
the amendment's second clause is met. 48 Second, the Court in
Camara and See adopted a balancing test to assess inspections
and searches that do not involve the exigent circumstances normally associated with exceptions to the warrant requirement. 49
Significantly, that balancing test led the Court to modify the
warrant mechanism rather than to fashion another exception, 50
and thus it created a new standard of administrative probable
cause.
C.

Colonnade and Biswell: The "Pervasively Regulated"
Exception

The Court had hinted in See that businesses might not in all
circumstances enjoy the same fourth amendment protection as
private dwellings. 51 In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 52 the Court fulfilled that prophecy. The defendant in
Colonnade, a licensed liquor dealer, challenged the admissibility
of untaxed liquor that federal agents had seized during a warrantless forcible search of his dealership. The district court granted
the dealer's motion to suppress the evidence, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the search was reasonable under
the fourth amendment. 53 The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and ordered the evidence suppressed, but only because
the forcible nature of the seizure violated the federal statute that
pelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure.
387 U.S. at 545 (footnote omitted).
48. This is not a necessary interpretation of the fourth amendment. The dissents of
Justice Clark in See, 387 U.S. at 546, and Justice Stevens in Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 325,
persuasively argued that if a search meets the reasonableness test in the first clause of
the amendment, no warrant should be required for the search. Their approach to the
fourth amendment also asserts that the probable cause standard for warrants in the
second clause of the amendment is an inflexible one that cannot be diluted by increased
governmental interest in the inspection.
49. 387 U.S. at 534-35.
50. See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1012.
51. See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
52. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
53. 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969), revd., 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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authorized the search. 54 The Court, through Justice Douglas, held
that Congress had determined by statute that searches, if carried
out as prescribed in the provisions of the act, were per se reasonable under the fourth amendment and required no warrant. Gs But
since the statute did not authorize forcible entry of the kind in
this case, the search did not fall within the class of congressionally established reasonable searches, and therefore required a
warrant. 56
The Court emphasized the liquor industry's long history of
legislative regulation, a history that predated the drafting of the
Constitution. 57 The Court used that history to justify Congress's
power to legislate the reasonableness of searches of regulated liquor dealers58 (and hence the applicability of the fourth amendment's warrant requirements). The Colonnade decision thus excepted the liquor industry from the warrant requirement of
Camara and See.
One might think that, due to the unique history of liquor
regulation, the exception would have stopped there. However,
two years later, the Colonnade exception assumed a much
broader scope in United States v. Biswell. 59 A federal treasury
agent visited Biswell, a pawnshop operator federally licensed to
sell sporting weapons. The agent inspected Biswell's books and
then requested to see the locked gun storeroom. Biswell asked the
agent if he had a search warrant. The agent replied that none was
necessary as the inspection was authorized by section 923(g) of
the Gun Control Act of 1968, 60 and gave Biswell a copy of the
relevant portion of the statute. Biswell then admitted the agent
to the storeroom, and the ensuing search uncovered two untaxed
and illegal sawed-off shotguns. 61 Biswell unsuccessfully attempted to have the evidence excluded from his trial and was
convicted of violating the Gun Control Act.
54. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 903 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7606
(1976)). The statute empowered government agents to enter and search any premises
where articles subject to liquor tax are produced or kept. Refusal to allow entry brought a
penalty of $500. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1976).
55. 397 U.S. at 77.
56. 397 U.S. at 77.
57. For interesting descriptions of liquor industry regulation from colonial times
through Prohibition, see R. CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL WORK (1947); J. POLLARD, THE RoAD
TO REPEAL (1932); G. THOMANN, COLONIAL LIQUOR LAWS (1887).
58. 397 U.S. at 77.
59. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
60. 18
§§ 921-928 (1976).
61. 406 U.S. at 312.

u.s.c.
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The conviction was reversed by the court of appeals 62 which
was, in turn, reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that
the treasury agent had not violated the fourth amendment. Unlike the agents in Colonnade, this one conducted the search in a
manner fully authorized by the statute; as a result, the search,
according to the reasoning of Colonnade, was per se reasonable
without a warrant. 63
In holding that searches of gun dealers under the Gun Control Act require no warrant, the Court drew an analogy to federal
regulation of liquor. 64 It distinguished See with the comment that
while periodic inspections adequately enforce most municipal
housing and fire codes, effective gun control necessitates
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections. " 65 A warrant requirement for such searches would either frustrate enforcement of the
Act or so dilute the probable cause requirement as to neutralize
any of the protection normally associated with a warrant. 66
In effect, the Biswell Court held that, in certain situations,
Congress can statutorily define a reasonable search and thus
waive the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The legality
of such searches depends not upon the authority of a valid warrant, but upon "the authority of a valid statute." 67 The Court
apparently did not find that the newly created warrant exception
posed any significant threat to privacy in the limited context of
its decision. 68
The decisions in Colonnade and Biswell spawned a series of
lower court decisions that greatly expanded the exception for pervasively regulated industries. Indeed, the exception threatened to
engulf the rule. By reasoning similar to that of Biswell, courts
found businesses inspected by the Food and Drug Administration
to be pervasively regulated and thus not subject to any warrant
62. Biswell v. United States, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971), revd., 406 U.S. 311
(1972).
63. 406 U.S. at 314.
64. The Court deemphasized the unique historical status of the liquor industry,
which seemed so vital to the Colonnade decision. Instead, it stressed the compelling need
to regulate firearms:
Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in
history as in governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this
traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime
and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders.
406 U.S. at 315.
65. 406 U.S. at 316.
66. 406 U.S. at 316.
67. 406 U.S. at 315.
68. 406 U.S. at 317.
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requirement. 69 The exception also spread to searches and inspections by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs70 as well
as those enforcing the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. 71
D. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: The Pendulum Swings
During that period of exceptional expansion, the constitutionality of inspections under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)72 came under challenge. One court
held that OSHA inspections lie within the Colonnade-Biswell
exception and that no warrant is necessary. 73 Other district courts
required a warrant for OSHA inspections but preserved the constitutionality of the Act by finding a mandate of warrants based
upon administrative probable cause within the statute's vague
language. 74
The district court in Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery 15 took still a third
approach to OSHA inspections. Bill Barlow, president and general manager of an electrical and plumhing business, received a
visit from an OSHA inspector in September 1975. Barlow asked
the inspector if he had received a complaint about his company.
When the inspector answered no, Barlow asked him if he had a
search warrant. After receiving a second no, Barlow refused to
admit the inspector to the nonpublic portion of the premises.
Three months later, the Secretary of Labor obtained an order
compelling Barlow to admit the inspector. Undaunted, Barlow
69. See, e.g., United States v. Acri Wholesale Grocery Co., 409 F. Supp. 529 (S.D,
Iowa 1976); United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973);
United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Del Campo
Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972). The District Court in Business Builders
even went so far as to say: "In effect, the statute [authorizing inspections] takes the place
of a valid search warrant." 354 F. Supp. at 143. But see United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S.
174 (1952).
70. United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
71. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). But
see United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated, 436
U.S. 942 (1978). The lower courts in Consolidation Coal had required a warrant for inspec•
tions under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976), but
only used the administrative probable cause standard. The Supreme Court vacated the
case in light of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
72. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976).
73. Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
74. Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Usery v.
Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods. Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627
(D.N.M. 1976).
75. 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), affd., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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again refused access and sought injunctive relief against OSHA's
warrantless search demand. The district court concluded that a
warrant must accompany any OSHA inspection; it refused, however, to interpret OSHA so broadly as to include a warrant mechanism and therefore held section 657(a) of the Act unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. 76 The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction77 to resolve the conflicting interpretations of
OSHA and to clarify the scope of the Colonnade-Biswell exception.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court panel. 78 Initially, it observed that the fourth amendment was "intended to
shield places of business as well as of residence. " 79 Camara and
See were thus controlling. The Court distinguished Colonnade
and Biswell, saying they should truly be the exception and not
the rule: 80
The element that distinguishes [the liquor and gun industries]
from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government
supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware. 81
·
76. 424 F. Supp. at 442.
77. 430 U.S. 964 (1976).
78. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (five-to-three decision). Justice Brennan did not participate
in the decision.
79. 436 U.S. at 312. Justice White's majority opinion reached this conclusion by
analyzing the historical circumstances of the fourth amendment's adoption:
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was
acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were
inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that
most irritated the colonists.
436 U.S. at 311 (footnotes omitted).
Justice White's history lesson, however, became the foundation for a counterargument in Justice Stevens's dissent. If the colonists feared the general warrant, then the
fourth amendment arguably was intended to prevent not warrantless searches but
searches with warrants that provided little or no protection:
The Framers' familiarity with the abuses attending the issuance of such general
warrants provided the principal stimulus for the restraints on arbitrary governmental intrusions embodied in the Fourth Amendment. . . . Since the general warrant,
not the warrantless search, was the immediate evil at which the Fourth Amendment was directed, it is not surprising that the Framers placed precise limits on
its issuance. The requirement that a warrant only issue on a showing of particular~
ized probable cause was the means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power.
436 U.S. at 327-28. Justice White solved the administrative search dilemma by requiring
administrative probable cause for OSHA warrants. However, warrants issued upon that
lesser standard come perilously close to being the "general" warrants that the fourth
amendment was designed to eliminate.
80. 436 U.S. at 313.
81. 436 U.S. at 313.
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OSHA, unlike federal liquor and gun control laws, regulates not
a single, discrete industry but rather the whole of American business. And the Court flatly refused to find that all interstate commerce fell under the rubric of "pervasively regulated":
Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to
later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under current practice and
law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect
on interstate commerce . . . .
. . .The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where
employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. 82

Recognizing the need to balance a business's fourth amendment rights against the need for effective enforcement through
periodic, random inspections not based on suspected violations,
the Court turned to the lesser standard of probable cause announced in Camara and See. 83 It rejected the argument that the
lower standard of administrative probable cause would result in
rubber stamp warrants providing only illusory protection to the
target of the inspection. 84 Having determined that the Constitution requires a warrant for OSHA searches, and carefully limiting
itself to the "specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees"
relevant to searches under that particular statute, 85 the Court
held the Act unconstitutional. 86
II.

WHAT THE COURT HATH WROUGHT FOURTH AMENDMENT

A THREE-TIERED

Though the route is tortuous, the Supreme Court's administrative search decisions in the past decade chart a course between
privacy rights and administrative needs. The cases culminating
in Barlow's suggest three distinct degrees of fourth amendment
protection: (1) warrants issued on traditional probable cause; (2)
warrants issued on administrative probable cause; and (3) warrantless exceptions.
82. 436 U.S. at 314-15.
83. 436 U.S. at 320. The evidence necessary to establish administrative probable
cause is discussed in text at notes 115-30 infra.
84. 436 U.S. at 322-24.
85. 436 U.S. at 323.
86. 436 U.S. at 325.
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Traditional Probable Cause

The fourth amendment specifies that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause.'' 87 While all authorities agree that
probable cause is a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant, what
quantum of evidence constitutes probable cause and whether
that quantum should be fixed or flexible remain in dispute.
In criminal law, the articulated standard of probable cause
is relatively settled: 88 "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. " 89 Evidence showing a
mere probability of criminal activity satisfies this standard: the
evidence need not be sufficient to convict or even amount to a
prima facie showing of an offense. 90 In fact, hearsay evidence,
although inadmissible at trial, may support a warrant "so long
as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. " 91
An affidavit supporting a warrant based on traditional probable cause must, however, contain more than mere conclusory
statements by the affiant. It must present some evidence of the
"underlying circumstances" upon which either the affiant's conclusions or those of his informant were based. 92 If the affiant relied
on an informant, his affidavit must also support the informant's
credibility. 93
-·
Factual evidence supporting the affiant's conclusions enables the magistrate - the central figure in the warrant procedure - to assess the reasonableness of the proposed search in0

87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See note 4 supra. The Supreme Court has expounded on
the historical basis of the probable cause requirement, most notably in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978), and in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100
(1959):
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The
general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and
the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the
oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police
control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of "probable cause"
before a magistrate was required.
(footnotes omitted).
88. The application of the standard to particular fact situations, in contrast, is not
nearly so clear. Compare, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), with Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
89. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
90. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965).
91. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960).
92. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). Accord, Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
93. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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dependently. The magistrate stands as a buffer between the
government and the private individual. Weighing the interests
of privacy and of efficient law enforcement that inevitably clash
in any search or inspection, he determines whether the facts
justify the search. 94
B. Administrative Probable Cause
The most notable aspect of the Camara and See decisions is
the determination that the term "probable cause" in the fourth
amendment need not mean the same thing for all government
searches. The standard of administrative probable cause established in those cases does not require any evidence of a violation
of the law, nor must the warrant specify .the articles to be seized
or the area to be searched. 95 Instead, the government need show
only that the inspection is necessary to further the legitimate
goals of the authorizing statute. 98 Moreover, the affidavit supporting the warrant need not allege conditions then existing on the
premises that are the subject of the search. 97 The magistrate conducts a balancing test, weighing the need for the search against
the invasion of privacy that it entails. 98
Some legal theorists object to the reduced standard of probable cause. They suggest that traditional probable cause should be
94. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21, 22 (1968); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
95. See McManis & McManis, supra note 11, at 960; OSHA Searches, supra note 11,
at 110.
96. See OSHA Searches, supra note 11, at 110.
97. Id.
98. McManis & McManis, supra note 11, at 960. Courts have applied this standard
to search warrants sought by numerous federal agencies. See, e.g., General Motors v.
Kostler, No. 78-7053 (E.D. Mich., filed March 14, 1978); Morris v. United States Dept.
of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 433 F.
Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis. 1977); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa.
1971). See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (subpoena
duces tecum for Department of Labor).
Unfortunately, the balance in most applications for administrative warrants is inherently one-sided. The warrant proceeding before a magistrate is almost always ex parte,
and the citizen never has the opportunity to present facts to bolster the privacy-interest
side of the scale. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 30. As a result, the privacy interest in the
balance almost never receives specific attention; instead, the warrant hearing concentrates on the government's claims of statutory authority. Professor LaFave suggests a
remedy to this problem: Notify owners of premises that the government proposes to search
and allow them to contest the warrant proceeding. LaFave, supra note 11, at 31. Of course,
such a mechanism could cause considerable delay and frustrate the enforcement of valid
regulatory schemes, a result that the Court in Camara and See struggled to avoid.
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the exclusive fourth amendment standard.99 Professor LaFave
takes a less extreme view, but he cautions:_
Although [the fact that the traditional probable cause standard
greatly hinders enforcement] would undoubtedly lead many to the
conclusion that a different sort of probable cause should be required for administrative inspections, this result should not be
lightly reached. To say that the probable cause required by the
, Fourth Amendment is not a fixed tes~, but instead involves a sort
99. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. See also Greenberg, supra note 11, at
1014.
At one time the Supreme Court appeared to adopt this View: "This [fourth amendment] prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches . . ... The Amendment is to be
liberally construed." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)
(evidence obtained from search pursuant to warrant containing no particulars of alleged
violation of National Prohibition Act excluded; defendant's'conviction overturned).
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1959), Justice Frankfurter declared that
it was better to create a complete exception to the probable cause standard than to give
flexibility to the probable cause standard:
·'
'
If a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly
interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue. A
loose basis for granting a search warrant for the situation before us is to enter by
way of the back door to a recognition of the fact that by reason of their intrinsic
elements, their historic sanctions, and their safeguards, tne Maryland proceedings
requesting permission to make a search without intruding .when permission is denied, do not offend the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The fear was that administrative probable cause would provide-no genuine protection for
the subject of the search; the issuance of an administrative warrant might become nothing
more than a "rubber stamp process" with the magistrate deferring to the expertise of the
agency seeking the warrant. LaFave, supra note 11, at 27. ·
However, the dual probable cause-standard is not without constitutional backing. The
standard was perhaps most eloquently defended by Justice Douglas in his dissent in
Frank: .
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify
an inference of "probable cause" to make an inspection are clearly different from
those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities, without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions
dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period
without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the
issuance of a warrant. The test of "probable cause" requfred by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought. That is
not to sanction synthetic search warrants but to recognize that the showing of
probable cause in a health case may have quite different requirements than the one
required in graver situations.
359 U.S. at 383. Since the Court explicitly recognized the constitutionality of the dual
probable cause standard in Camara, See, and Barlow's, continued attack on it might well
be dismissed as a pointless academic exercise. Nonetheless, such exercise does underscore
a constitutional necessity: Whatever probable cause standard the Constitution requires
for a particular search, it must provide genuine protection and not become an empty
ritual.
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of calculus incorporating all the surrounding circumstances of the
intended search, constitutes a major departure from existing constitutional doctrine. And it could well be a departure with a multitude of consequences. 100

The argument for the single probable cause standard stresses
the possibility that a search under a less stringent standard might
uncover evidence of a crime. 101 A solution offered by at least one
commentator is to issue warrants on administrative probable
cause, but to exclude evidence gained in that search from any
subsequent criminal prosecution. 102 The trouble with that solution is that nearly all administrative and regulatory inspection
schemes provide some sort of criminal sanctions, albeit minor
ones. 103 Furthermore, it is a solution the courts do not seem prepared to accept. Several have already upheld criminal convictions based on evidence seized during searches justified by administrative probable cause. 104
So how did the Supreme Court justify the lesser standard of
probable cause for administrative searches? The Camara Court
first argued that administrative inspections had "a long history
of judicial and public acceptance." 105 Professor LaFave points out
that this argument is historically inaccurate and logically unsound: Cases reviewing periodic and area inspections are rare,
and "acquiescence" may more accurately describe the public's
attitude toward the searches than "acceptance." 106 Moreover, the
Court has seldom felt restrained by even substantial histories of
100. LaFave, supra note 11, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
101. The basic argument is that the defendant should not be subjected to criminal
liability upon evidence that could have been obtained only through an administrative
warrant because insufficient evidence existed for a criminal warrant:
But evidence seized under the administrative search exception is not limited to
administrative proceedings. It may well be found that the continued existence of
standards for administrative "inspections" less strict than those for criminal
searches, notwithstanding the greater degree of culpability associated with criminal
activity, represents a severe diminution of those constitutional safeguards formerly
provided by the fourth amendment. The constriction will continue unabated only
at an exorbitant price.
Beyond the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 122.
102. Administrative Inspections, supra note 10, at 292-95.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974) (conviction
on federal liquor law violation based upon See-type standard upheld); United States v.
Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973) (seizure
of illegal guns during administrative narcotics search upheld); United States v. Ciaccio,
356 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Md. 1972) (illegal firearm seized in administrative search under
federal liquor law admitted as evidence).
105. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537.
106. LaFave, supra note 11, at 14.
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judicial and public acceptance when convinced that accepted
practice was unconstitutional. 107
The Camara Court also felt that the compelling need for
enforcement of public safety regulations demanded that such
administrative inspections be liberated from a traditional probable cause test. 108 Unfortunately, that argument begs the question;
the real issue is whether the Constitution mandates traditional
probable cause for all governmental intrusions. If so, the competing public need must be subordinated to the mandates of the
fourth amendment. Otherwise - if the public interest in efficient
enforcement of health and safety regulations were truly controlling - the same reasoning would dictate a lower probable cause
standard for criminal searches as well:
Although others have also asserted a need for 100 percent enforcement of these ordinances, it is difficult to accept that as a justification for a diluted probable cause test. One might as cogently argue
that there is a need for universal compliance with the criminal law
and that the public interest demands that all dangerous offenders
be convicted and punished. It is certainly not a novel observation
that in the field of criminal law this argument has not prevailed,
and that instead we are committed to a philosophy tolerating a
certain level of undetected crime as preferable to an oppressive
police state. If there is a greater public interest in total enforcement of housing codes than _pf the criminal law, the Camara opin- ·
ion does not explain why. 109
107. Id.
108. 387 U.S. at 535-36.
109. LaFave, supra note 11, at 14 (footnotes omitted). LaFave does not, however,
advocate the elimination of administrative probable cause. In lieu of the three arguments
offered by the majority in Camara, he proposes two justifications for the lower standard
of probable cause. One is "the inability to acomplish an acceptable level of code enforcement under the traditional probable cause test." Id. at 20. Unlike the criminal law, where
the public nature of most crimes permits effective enforcement notwithstanding the stiffer
traditional probable cause requirement, enforcement of health and safety regulatory
schemes is frustrated by traditional probable cause because of the inherent difficulty of
detecting code violations at their incipient stages. Id. at 16.
LaFave's second contention supporting the administrative probable cause test closely
tracks the Court's third line of reasoning in Camara: Periodic and area inspection programs for code enforcement involve a "relatively minor invasion of personal privacy and
dignity." Id. at 20. LaFave argues that inspecting plumbing fixtures and electric wiring
does not intrude upon personal privacy and dignity as much as rummaging through desk
drawers and personal belongings.
Yet that argument overlooks two points. Frequently, administrative inspections do
involve more than a survey of physical fixtures. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971). This is particularly true of inspections of business premises, which often require
inspection of business papers. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); United States
ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F. 2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974);
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The Camara Court attempted to distinguish such an overextension of its reasoning with a third argument: regulatory health
and safety inspections do not involve as significant an invasion
of the citizen's privacy as a criminal search. 110 This view is clearly
a remnant of the distinction between criminal and civil searches
that undergirded the early Frank case. 111 Yet it conflicts with the
United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); United
States v. Cre,spo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968); People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc.
2d 222, 350 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1973).
Moreover, even if such inspections scan only the physical facilities, it is questionable,
at least in the home, whether the citizen suffers a lesser intrusion upon privacy. One can
hardly imagine a clearer illustration of an invasion of personal privacy than a government
code inspector checking the wiring and light switches in one's bedroom, or examirting the
plumbing fixtures in the bathroom. Indeed, as Judge Perryman sagely remarked in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd., 339 U.S. 1 (1950), "even if
the front door of the house is no longer protected by the Constitution, surely it had been
thought until now that the bathroom is." 178 F.2d at 18. Thus, LaFave's notion that such
inspections present a lesser intrusion of privacy must originate in the much-maligned yet
persistent distinction between criminal searches and civil-code enforcement inspections.
See notes 21 & 37 supra.
110. 387 U.S. at 537.
111. The civil-criminal distinction should be laid to rest. It has survived only by
feeding on a fundamental misunderstanding of the fourth amendment. The fifth amendment protects against self-incrimination. The fourth amendment, in contrast, guards
personal privacy. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 7. The relationship that may exist between
these two distinct amendments was first recognized in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). However, that relationship regrettably was blurred by an intermingling of the
two amendments as a single "law of searches and seizures" in Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 587 (1946), and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For fully twelve years
since Camara and See, the Supreme Court has attempted to dispel this constitutional
misinterpretation, but the notion remains. The relatively early case of District of Columbia u. Little forcefully refuted the basic error of the civil-criminal distinction:
It is argued that the Fourth Amendment provision regarding searches is premised
upon and limited by the Fifth Amendment provision regarding self.
incrimination. . . . The argument is wholly without merit, preposterous in fact.
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against
self-incrimination; it was the common-law right of a man to privacy in his
home. . . . It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. It belonged to all
men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. . . . To say that a man suspected
of a crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant,
but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity.
178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd., 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
The fourth amendment should stand as a grant of the fundamental freedom from
government intrusion in private areas. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy
in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 212, 250; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154 (1977). Where emergency conditions
necessitate relaxation of fourth amendment standards, a few exceptions are allowed begrudgingly. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (Qearch incident to lawful
arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile excep•
tion).
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reasoning in Camara that compelled the overruling of Frank. In
the words of Professor Beaney:
The most disturbing aspect of the Frank and Eaton decisions is the
rationale of Justice Frankfurter that the Fourth Amendment
means less when invoked to protect privacy than it does when used
to restrict official searches for evidence. One justification for the
application of the Fourth that [has been] set forth on numerous
occasions is that sheltering the guilty in many cases provides the
only effective way of protecting the innocent. But when the privacy
of the innocent is invaded, the Court found the right to be insignificant.112

History as well rejects the distinction between civil and criminal searches: the fourth amendment largely reflects the colonists'
dread of the British writs of assistance, which permitted regulatory, not criminal, searches. 113 The sanctity of the home and of
private property was the intended object of fourth amendment
protection. A government agent who invades private property
without permission imperils that sanctity, whether in the course
of a criminal or an administrative search.
Yet we have passed the point of no return on the path to
multiple probable cause standards. Camara and See will never be
overturned; Frank will never be revived. In 1979, the surest means
of preserving the interests of subjects of administrative searches
is to elucidate a clear, easily applied definition of the adolescent
standard of administrative probable cause. Not until recently,
however, have courts even begun to wrestle with the question of
what specific evidence is necessary to demonstrate administrative probable cause. The issue in most lower court cases following
Camara and See was whether the search required a.warrant at all,
and, if so, which probable cause standard should apply. 114 Unfortunately, the Camara decision provided little, if any, guidance as
Almost all of these exceptions arise in the criminal sphere, where emergency situations are most likely to occur. Hence, the criminal law is where fourth amendment protections have been diluted rather than expanded, contrary to what proponents of the civilcriminal distinctions would assert. This dilution is justified, as the fourth amendment
dictates that personal privacy should be invaded only in situations of dire emergency.
112. Beaney, supra note 111, at 245.
113. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51 (1937).
114. See, e.g., Morris v. United ·states Dept. of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill.
1977); Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Usery v.
Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga.1977); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., 374
F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
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to what an application for an administrative search warrant must
contain. 115
In Barlow's, the Court did elaborate on the requirements of
administrative probable cause, but its vague guidelines were by
way of example only:
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for
example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries
across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any
of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's
Fourth Amendment rights. 116

As a result of this limited guidance, lower courts have struggled
alone to establish the standards for an administrative warrant.
Perhaps the most informative opinion on the topic is that of
Judge Turk in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor. 117 In
Reynolds, the plaintiff plant owner moved to quash an OSHA
inspection warrant issued by a United States magistrate contending that it contained no facts demonstrating probable cause to
believe that specific violations existed on the premises. 118 In reply,
the government argued that administrative probable cause re-

115. See text at notes 39-41 supra.
116. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978).
117. 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977).
118. The affidavit in support of the warrant presented to the magistrate included,
inter alia, the following facts:
1. Computer printout information at the local OSHA field office revealed that the
plaintiffs plant had never been inspected.
2. At the time the inspector sought the warrant, no "immediate danger situations,
fatalities or catastrophes, complaints, or follow-up inspections" were on his
agenda.
3. The "Worst-First" list, data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which
ranks industries by frequency of accidents and injuries, was used by OSHA as a
planning guide for general schedule inspections in order to insure that limited
OSHA resources were most efficiently allocated to the inspection of industries
where the likelihood of employee injury is greatest.
4. Consultation of the "Worst-First" list revealed the plaintiffs industry to be one
of the most hazardous, ranking twentieth on the list.
5. Up to the time immediately prior to the application for the warrant, all but one
of the nineteen industries preceding the plaintiffs on the "Worst-First" list had
already been inspected by agents of the local OSHA field office (the one not inspected was performing government contract work for the Navy).
6. The time, place, and scope of the inspection was specified in accordance with
the appropriate sections of the OSH Act.
7. The inspector agreed to make a return to the court upon completion of the
inspection.
442 F. Supp. at 196-97.
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quires only a showing that the inspection "is part of a rational
plan prepared and approved by the agency in an attempt to effectuate the enforcement of the act." 119 Furthermore, it offered two
independent justifications for the warrant: (1) the mere passage
of time between inspections, and (2) the agency's inspection plan
that relied upon a "Worst-First" ranking of industries by safety
records. 120
The district court upheld the administrative warrant, relying
most heavily upon the "Worst-First" inspection plan. 121 In dictum, it mentioned other potential methods of demonstrating
administrative probable cause, such as a "history of past violations" and "current complaints from employees regarding work
conditions." 122 The court concluded that since OSHA had proposed the inspection pursuant to an apparently rational and nondiscriminatory plan, the agency had satisfied the requirements of
administrative probable cause. 123 Thus, under the Reynolds standard, the only fundamental
protection afforded by administrative
.;:
probable cause is :freedom from government harassment through
arbitrary and capricious searches. 124
On the other hand, the court in Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser
Co. 125 found an OSHA affidavit insufficient for an administrative
search warrant. In constrast to the detailed justifications outlined
in Reynolds, the Weyerhaeuser affidavit stated only that an
inspection three years earlier had uncovered a violation, which
the firm had since corrected, and that the entire industry held an
"occupational [hazard] rate of 19.1."126 The court found neither
fact in the affidavit sufficient to establish administrative probable cause. Listing the industry's injury rate without more does not
give the judge any information about how that industry ranks
with other industries or whether the more dangerous industries
119. 442 F. Supp. at 198.
120. 442 F. Supp. at 200.
121. 442 F. Supp. at 200-01.
122. 442 F. Supp. at 200.
123. The court's holding permits future refinement of the standard:
Although the court notes OSHA might have selected any one of several methods to
determine which industries and plants would be inspected, the instant plan appears
rational and non-discriminatory, and as such is sufficient to establish probable
cause for the inspection warrant.
442 F. Supp. at 200 (emphasis added).
124. 442 F. Supp. at 201. This conclusion regarding the limited protection provided
by administrative warrants has interesting and crucial implications when applied to
searches of the home. See text at notes 139-46 infra.
125. 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978).
126. 456 F. Supp. at 478.
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have already been inspected. 127 The court flatly rejected the contention that mere passage of time can serve as a "reasonable,
discernible administrative standard" for probable cause. 128 Finally, the court refused to find that a violation which had been
previously discovered and since corrected constituted probable
cause to inspect again. 129 This reasoning recognizes the inherent
dangers of harassment and arbitrary searches that could result if
prior violations, although corrected, could establish administrative probable cause.
Overall, defining administrative probable cause at this time
is perhaps a futile task, as the courts only now are beginning to
address the subject with any degree of specificity . 130 The next few
127. There is no indication of [the plant's] ranking on the list and there is no
explanation of the hazard rate •... Above all, there is no indication of why [this
plant], or even [this industry group], was being chosen for inspection..•. Without comparable information [to the Reynolds case] in this affidavit to describe the
administrative standards being followed, there can be no meaningful judicial review
of the discretion being exercised by OSHA officials. Approval of a search warrant
based on this affidavit would amount to a "rubber-stamp" such as was impliedly
rejected by the Barlow's Court.
456 F. Supp. at 482.
128. 456 F. Supp. at 483.
129. 456 F. Supp. at 482-83.
130. The Reynolds and Weyerhaeuser decisions may actually raise more questions
than they answer. The two cases appear to conflict: while Weyerhaeuser holds that neither
mere passage of time nor past violations by the business are proper evidence of administrative probable cause, 456 F. Supp at 482-83, Reynolds indicates that a history of past
violations may suffice. 442 F. Supp. at 200.
Moreover, Weyerhaeuser's wording suggests that an administrative warrant requires
proof of a rational plan enforcing a valid regulatory statute. Yet such a requirement
contravenes the Reynolds court's holding that administrative probable cause may be
established without a plan by conduct of the business to be searched or evidence gained
from informants such as employees. See 442 F. Supp. at 200. It would seem anomalous to
hold that conduct or evidence from informants cannot establish ad1J1inistrative probable
cause when those are the only means to establish the more stringent traditional probable
cause.
But if informants or past conduct can satisfy the administrative probable cause
standard, perhaps an employee complaint that fails to reach traditional probable cause
standards may nevertheless constitute administrative probable cause. Such a conclusion
would require the courts to approach administrative probable cause as a less onerous but
analogous variant of criminal probable cause and would raise numerous questions. For
example, could an employee complaint in one department of a plant establish probable
cause to inspect the entire facility? The resultant process of defining administrative probable cause could prove as lengthy and tedious as that of defining traditional probable
cause, a process that continues today. See text at notes 87-104 supra.
Furthermore, Weyerhaeuser and Reynolds deal only with OSHA inspections. Courts
have yet to analyze administrative probable cause for other government inspections. Perhaps most importantly, the rather vague standard of administrative probable cause for
code enforcement inspections of the home has yet to be refined.
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years should see a series of cases developing the contours of this
emerging standard.
C. No Warrant Required: The "Pervasively Regulated"
Exception 131

For the "pervasively regulated" (or Colonnade-Biswell} 132 ex131. Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been categorized in other ways. See,
e.g., McManis & McManis, supra note 11; Rothstein & RothsteiI_1, supra note 11;
Administrative Search WaiTants, supra note 11. Besides the usual criminal search exceptions, see note 111 supra, the literature frequently mentions the open fields exception and
the welfare search exception. However, each of these exceptions appears to exist exclusively in the case that originated it: the former in Air Pollution Variance Ed. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 .(1974), the latter in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
132. What has become known as the "pervasively regulated" exception to the warrant
requirement has, at various stages in its development, gone under the rubric of the
"licensing exception," doctrine of implied consent, and finally the "pervasively regulated" (or Colonnade-Biswell) exception.
The exception finds its modern roots in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
Federal agents, without a warrant, searched the defendant's gas station and determined
that the proper number of gas coupons were not on hand. The Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction on the grounds that, since the coupons were government property and not
private documents, the defendant was only the custodian of government property (the
coupons) and had to consent to the search.
The licensing exception bloomed in Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965), which upheld the warrantless search of a federally
licensed liquor dealer on the grounds that fourth amendment proscriptions do not apply
as stringently where the search consists of an inspection of public documents that the
federal licensee is required to keep. Many courts agreed, sanctioning warrantless searches
"merely because the subject of a search was a licensee." Beyond the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 11, at 96.
The weakness of the licensing exception was dramatized in United States v. Hart,
359 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1973). In that case, the defendant gun dealer was convicted of
a violation of federal gun control Jaws and, as a result, lost his license. Before going to
prison, the defendant attempted to liquidate his remaining stock of weapons through an
advertised sale. A federal agent noticed the advertisement and conducted a warrantless
search of the defendant's premises. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress, holding that the warrantless exception applied only to licensed dealers. Since
the defendant's license had been revoked, the government could no longer search the
dealership without a warrant, even though the defendant was conductmg an advertised
sale of firearms after revocation of his license. Evidently, those dealers who have lost their
license merit greater protection than those who have acted lawfully!
The court had earlier noted this mconsistency m United States v. Del Campo Baking
Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972), by upholding a warrantless FDA inspection
even though the FDA did not have licensing procedures. The test for reasonableness of
the search examined the statutorily authorized degree of regulation over the particular
industry; it was not dependent upon the presence or absence of a piece of paper called a
license. 345 F. Supp. at 1377. Except for a few aberrant cases such as Hart, Del Campo
signalled the demise of the licensing exception rationale.
Some courts relied on implied consent to justify warrantless inspections of regulated
commercial enterprises. This approach was especially popular among state courts that
upheld wamintless inspections enforcmg state regulatory and licensmg schemes. See, e.g.,
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ception to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the enterprise
in question must be engaged in a "pervasively regulated business"; (2) warrantless inspection must be necessary to further an
"urgent federal interest" expressed in authorizing legislation; and
(3) that legislation must limit the time, place, and scope of authorized inspections. 133 The definition of what industries fall
within the "peryasively regulated" exception remains vague, but
as previously noted, courts have so characterized several industries. 134 In each of these industries the regulating statute addresses a fairly discrete, definable segment of commerce and is
not applicable to business in interstate commerce generally.' 35
The exception has been a target of scholarly criticism. Some
claim that the exception is unnecessary and illogical. Since an
administrative warrant is relatively easy to obtain and typically
may be acquired through an ex parte hearing, the inspecting
officer really has "no excuse for not obtaining one as a matter of
Daley v. Berzanskis, 47 Ill. 2d 395, 269 N.E. 2d 716 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999
(1971); Lanchester v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commn., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct.
85, 325 A.2d 648 (1974); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971).
The merchant, it was argued, by voluntarily entering into a regulated form of business,
impliedly had waived most if not all privacy rights in its operation. See Harkey v. deWet•
ter, 443 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal
Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Although one commentator suggests that the Colonnade and Biswell decisions and
their progeny can be explained in terms of the implied consent doctrine, Beyond the
Fourth Amendment, supra I}ote 11, at 105, the cases more accurately reflect a refinement
of the "pervasively regulated" exception:
Prior to Biswell, the validity of an administrative search was often resolved by
reference to an "implied consent" theory: by entering the business, the citizen was
presumed to have consented to governmental intrusions. "Implied consent" is, of
course, a fiction, a catchphrase with no real content; the courts imply a consent to
search which was never in fact given. Biswell applied a different analysis: where a
dealer is provided in advance with detailed information concerning his obligations
and the government's inspection powers, the inspection program presents only a
"limited" threat to the dealer's "justifiable expectations of privacy." This reason•
ing is more responsive to the fourth amendment concerns under a balancing theory
than the "implied consent" rationale.
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1025-26 (footnotes omitted).
133. McAdams & Miljas, OSHA and Wa"antless Inspections, 29 LABOR L.J. 49, 54
(1978). Several other requirements for the Colonnade-Biswell exception have been detailed by courts and commentators, but the basic interests involved are the same in all of
them. See generally Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977);
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Comment, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Wa"antless Routine OSHA Inspections a Violation
of the Fourth Amendment?, 6 ENVTL. A.FF., 423, 432-33 (1978).
134. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
135. Cases indicate that warrantless searches are authorized only where a particular
industry is the subject of regulatory statutes. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp.
627 (D.N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
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course or at least as a safety precaution when other validation
factors such as consent are questionable." 136 Moreover, no factors
peculiar to pervasively regulated industries demand such unique
treatment. It is difficult to see why an agent of the Division of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms need not obtain a warrant to
inspect a registered alcohol dealer, but an agent of the Federal
Drug Enforcement Agency must do so to inspect a registered
pharmacy. The fourth amendment appears neither to contain nor
to condone such fine, indeed arbitrary, distinctions.
One especially troubling aspect of the "pervasively regulated" exception is the Court's contention in Biswell that Congress's expression of an urgent federal interest in the authorizing
statute may justify an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 137 The reasoning behind this argument threatens the entire fabric of the fourth amendment:
The obvious implication is that it is within the discretion of Congress to apply or not apply the fourth amendment, a postulate
wholly inconsistent with the balance of interests theory of CamaraSee and Terry. Once there is a governmental intrusion the fourth
amendment "applies"; a fourth amendment issue has at least been
raised, and the proper inquiry is how it is to be resolved considering
governmental needs and the protections due the citizens. 138
136. United States v. Pugh, 417 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
137. 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
138. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1018-19. The compelling interest argument for
warrantless municipal code inspections of private dwellings has also been attacked:
When the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, it, of course, by implication, permits reasonable searches. But reasonableness without a warrant is adjudged solely by the extremity of the circumstances of the moment and not by any
general characteristic of the officer or his mission. If an officer is pursuing a felon
who runs into a house and hides, the officer may follow and arrest him. But this is
because under the exigencies of circumstances the law of pursuit supersedes the rule
as to search. There is no doctrine that search for garbage is reasonable while search
for arms, stolen goods or gambling equipment is not. Moreover, except for the most
urgent of necessities, the question of reasonableness is for a magistrate and not the
enforcement officer.
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd. on other grounds,
339 U.S. 1 (1950) (emphasis added).
The interpretation of the fourth amendment in Little is an exceedingly literal one,
reminiscent of the stance taken by the majority in Frank v. Maryland and the dissenters
in See and Barlow's. Such an interpretation would require administrative authorities to
find means other than area and periodic inspections of private dwellings to enforce code
provisions. It would permit warrantless searches only where emergency conditions preclude obtaining a warrant; it would reject the Camara-See argument that requirement of
a traditional probable cause warrant would frustrate enforcement. Although this interpretation may be an artifact that has been effectively displaced by subsequent decisions, the
argument remains persuasive. Citizens' constitutional privacy interests should not suffer
because they impede law enforcement. The former are clearly paramount. Rather, the

1318

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1291

The danger of this exception is that it sees only the government's interest in the search and not the threatened privacy of
the subject of the search. This myopia contributed to the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman v. James 139 where the Court
allowed a warrantless administrative inspection of a welfare recipient's home. The appellee, an Aid to Families with Dependent
Children recipient, refused to permit a caseworker to enter her
home even after several days' advance notice of the visit. The
New York aid program required home visits by caseworkers as a
condition for continued assistance. 140 Threatened with loss of her
benefits, James sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing
that such visits, lacking consent or a warrant supported by probable cause, violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 141
Although a three-judge district court panel allowed James's
claim, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the state visitation program. 142 The Court's two-pronged opinion first suggested
that the visitation program was not a fourth amendment search
at all, noting that the state neither "forced" nor "compelled" the
search and that there were no criminal sanctions for refusal to
submit; if the recipient had withheld consent, there would have
been no search. 143 That argument is hardly overwhelming. 144
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its first contention, the
Court introduced a second argument, one more interesting for the
purpose of this Note: Even if the visits were fourth amendment
searches, they were reasonable ones and required no warrant. The
Court reasoned analogously to Colonnade and Biswell, holding
solution lies in more thoughtful and innovative drafting of legislation with new, constitutionally legitimate ways to enforce such code provisions. See note 174 infra.
139. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
140. 400 U.S. at 311-12 & nn. 2-4.
141. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
142. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
143. 400 U.S. at 317.
144. It is difficult to believe that such a visitation could not be considered a fourth
amendment search. A government worker entered the home to see that the parent provided a suitable environment for the child and that welfare benefits were not misused.
The intrusion necessary to determine those facts can hardly be minimal. Moreover, the
assertion that the beneficiary has the right to refuse the visit without threat of government
sanctions is both inaccurate and naive. The welfare recipient has no greater freedom to
refuse the visit and forfeit future benefits than a businessman has to refuse entry to OSHA
inspectors and shut down his business. In both situations, economic realities remove all
elements of choice. This is especially true for the welfare recipient, who presumably
applies for benefits out of necessity and must be practically destitute to qualify. Further,
to deny a child support funds because of a mother's refusal to consent to a visit is contrary
to the goals of the aid program.
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that warrantless searches were the only effective way to carry out
the statutory purpose, and that the public's enforcement interest
outweighed James's privacy interest. 145 This argument, too, has
faced considerable criticism, 146 as it inherits many of the faults
inherent in the Colonnade-Biswell exception. The majority opinion appears to have cast aside fourth amendment guarantees
merely because an "urgent federal interest" was at stake. But
surely federal or state government may not remove a search from
the purview of the fourth amendment simply by labeling it
"urgent." Second, in asserting that a welfare search is less intrusive than a criminal one, the Court reverted to the ill-conceived
distinction between civil and criminal searches that it rejected in
Camara and See. Noncriminal searches triggered fourth amendment protection in those cases; home investigations by a welfare
caseworker in Wyman, however, did not.
Regrettably, the Wyman Court too easily extended the
"pervasively regulated" exception from businesses into the
home. Although the government's interest arguably may be as
important in Wyman as in Colonnade or Biswell, the privacy
interests of the subject of the search are quite different. Yet by
emphasizing the government's, and not the citizen's interests,
the Court denied warrant protection in both situations.
Thus, basic difficulties remain in the Supreme Court's administrative search decisions. Establishing administrative probable cause in Camara, the Court inadequately anticipated several
inconsistencies of a dual fourth amendment standard. Deficiencies in fourth amendment protection, most notably those caused
by the "pervasively regulated" exception, will persist under any
approach that weighs the government's enforcement interest
more heavily than the citizen's privacy interest. Most disturbingly, however, the Wyman Court permitted a variant of that
exception to creep into a private residence, denying the home
fourth amendment protection that was deemed so vital in
Camara and See.
145. The principal argument is threefold. First, the Court used a public trust rationale: The government, in fulfilling an important social goal, should have the power to see
that the allocated public funds are spent properly by the recipient. See 400 U.S. at 31819. Second, the Court distinguished the visit on the grounds that it was not a criminal
type of search. 400 U.S. at 321-23. Finally, the Court asserted that a warrant requirement,
to allow efficient enforcement, would have to be so diluted that it would provide little or
no protection. 400 U.S. at 323-24.
146. See, e.g., Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact
of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); 85 HARv. L. REV. 258 (1971); 24 VAND.
L. REV. 821 (1971).
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APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS:

A

COMMERCIAL-PRIVATE DWELLING DISTINCTION

Whatever the merits or demerits of the administrative probable cause standard, it is apt to remain. A dramatic shift in the
Supreme Court's thinking, aligning with the dissents' rationale in
See and Barlow's, seems unlikely. Therefore, the real issue is not
whether a dual standard of probable cause should exist, but to
what situations the administrative standard, as opposed to traditional probable cause, should apply.
While commentators suggest several solutions, 147 the Supreme Court has taken an ad hoc approach - determining
whether a warrant is necessary for each inspection program as
cases arise, formulating exceptions as needed. Yet, because
fourth amendment protections are vital, 148 some coherent doctrine of government searches should be developed. Such a coherent doctrine needs a reference point - a focus around which new
refinements may reliably and consistently revolve. It has become
clear that the Camara-See balancing approach fails to provide
that reference point: the decisions have been unpredictable and
inequitable. And yet a workable reference point has already been
at least implicitly suggested. 149 In fact, it practically leaps out of
the fourth amendment. The fulcrum over which the choice between standards should balance is the potential intrusiveness of
147. Among the better suggestions is LaFave's proposed dual requirements of notice
and adversary proceedings before instigation of the inspection. See note 98 supra. Most
likely, the Court has not taken this approach because it could undercut code enforcement
in many areas where surprise checks are vital to ensure compliance. See, e.g., See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
Another proposal would require administrative probable cause for "routine" searches
and traditional probable cause for "non-routine" searches. Administatiue Search Warants, supra note 11, at 641-43. A routine inspection is described as one that is part of "a
systematic program of inspection [that] naturally includes the property in question." Id.
at 641. Thus, a nonroutine inspection is one that is directed at a particular citizen or
business upon suspicion of a violation. The author concludes that "when an inspection
begins to approximate a traditional criminal investigation a warrant should never be
issued in the absence of traditional probable cause." Id. at 642.
Beyond the obvious problems for judges in refining this proposal's distinction for
application to borderline cases, the separation of routine and nonroutine searches suffers
from the same pitfalls as the civil-criminal distinction. While not based upon the threat
of potential criminal liability, the proposal still provides warrant protection for those
particular individuals who are suspected of civil violations (by definition, these are subjects ofnonroutine inspections) while providing no warrant protection for those suspected
of no violations (the subjects of routine searches). The weaknesses of such an approach
are discussed at notes 21, 37, and 111 supra.
148. See notes 79 & 87 supra.
149. See Administrative Search Wa"ants, supra note 11, at 621.
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the search. The doctrine chosen must provide different levels of
probable cause that principally reflect not the urgency of the
government interest to be advanced, but rather the threat to
citizens' privacy.
Traditional probable cause secures the right to privacy in its
broadest sense: the right to be free from any government intrusion
unless there is reason to suspect a violation of the law on the
premises. 150 Traditional probable cause thus can be seen as a
device that guards the "indefeasible right to personal security,
personal liberty, and private property." 151 The interest was probably best described by Justice Brandeis: "the right to be let alone
. . . the right most valued by civilized men." 152
Administrative probable cause, in contrast, provides little
protection for privacy in that traditional sense. 153 It does, however, supply a significant measure of fourth amendment protection. The magistrate in an administrative probable cause hearing
reduces the threat that administrative inspections, through arbitrary or discriminatory application, will become a tool for harassment.154 Thus, although administrative probable cause may be
established without suspicion of a specific violation, it protects
the citizen's privacy from the capricious whim of the inspector.
So how is a court to know when a privacy interest is strong
enough to justify the more stringent traditional standard, and
when it is only strong enough to justify the weaker administrative
standard? This Note contends that the answer lies in the most
fundamental societal structure of privacy: the home.
A. Searches and Inspections of the Home: Traditional Probable
Cause
If in one place a citizen's privacy interest is overpowering, it
is in the home. 155 In an era of pervasive government regulation
150. See text at notes 88-94 supra.
151. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
152. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
153. See Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 11, at 643; LaFave, supra note
11, at 37.
154. See text at note 84 supra.
155. In Wyman v. James, the Court observed:
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home
. . . an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment
rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis
indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the
home. . . . And over the years the Court has consistently been most protective of
the privacy of the dwelling.
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and control, the home stands as the last enclave against governmental scrutiny:
The values of the home protected by the Fourth Amendment are
not peculiar to capitalism as we have known it; they are equally
relevant to the new form of socialism which we are entering. Moreover, as the numbers of functionaries and inspectors multiply, the
need for protection of the individual becomes indeed more essential if the values of a free society are to remain.
The bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow,
lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone's
life at numerous points. It pries more and more into private affairs,
breaking down the barriers that individuals erect to give them
some insulation from the intrigues and harassment of modern life.
Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the
sanctuary of the home is such . . . ,156

The Supreme Court's treatment of pornography and its use
in the home reflects that sanctity. In Stanley u. Georgia, 167 the
defendant appealed a conviction for possession of obscene material that police had found in his bedroom under authority of a
warrant. Although the Court struck down the statute primarily
400 U.S. at"316. This unique sanctity of the home has roots almost as old as civilization:
The peculiar immunity that the law has thrown around the dwelling house of man,
pithily expressed in the maxim, "a man's house is his castle," was not an invention
of English jurisprudence. Even in ancient times there were evidences of that same
concept in custom and law, partly as a result of the natural desire for privacy, partly
an outgrowth, in all probability, of the emphasis placed by the ancients upon the
home as a place of hospitality, shelter, and protection.
N. LAssoN, supra note 113, at 13. Based upon this firm historical foundation, the English
common law bestowed greater protection upon the "sanctity of an individual's home"
than it did to the "privacy of his person." Beaney, supra note 111, at 235. The privacy
interest in the home is nowhere better illustrated than in the famous words of William
Pitt before Parliament in 1766:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Quoted in N. LASSON, supra note 113, at 49-50.
The principle of the home as a haven from government intrusion travelled across the
Atlantic and is now embedded in American jurisprudence. Indeed, the sanctity of the
home has been described as a "core value" of the fourth amendment:
The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long
history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). It was in part that right to privacy
in the home which led the Supreme Court to support the marital privacy right in the
contraceptive cases. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis original)
(footnote omitted).
157. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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on first amendment grounds, the decision stressed that the search
took place in the home:
[The appellant] is asserting the right to read or observe what he
pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free
from state inquiry into the contents of his library. . . . Whatever
may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity,
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. 15H

Privacy in the home holds paramount respect in criminal
search cases, 159 and courts narrowly construe statutes that authorize home searches. In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 160 for
example, police discovered heroin during a warrantless search of
a federal probationer's residence. One condition of her probation
required that she submit to a search of her person or property at
any time. The government argued that the Federal Probation Act
of 1948161 authorized such a condition. The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to interpret the Act so broadly, invalidating the
condition on the grounds that the Act did not authorize searches
that failed to meet fourth amendment standards. 162 No federal
statute could force the probationer to surrender her right of privacy in the home as a condition for release.
Courts respect the home privacy interest for administrative
searches as well. In District of Columbia v. Little, 163. the defendant was convicted of interfering with a health inspector's duties
158. 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
Moreover, in the context of this case - a prosecution for mere possession of printed
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home - that right [to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth] takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circuiµstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.
394 U.S. at 564.
This implied "added dimension" has definite fourth amendment overtones. Although
the Court's opinion relied primarily on the first amendment, it did not deny a possible
fourth amendment violation; it simply did not reach the issue, although the opinion
certainly borrows from fourth amendment rationale. Indeed, three Justices concurred in
a separate opinion and specifically found a fourth amendment violation. 394 U.S. at 572.
Had the search been warrantless or based upon less than traditional probable cause, it
seems likely the entire Court would have reached that conclusion.
159. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
160. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) (warrantless search of parolee's house by parole officers,
as opposed to law enforcement officers in Consuelo-Gonzalez, upheld).
161. 18 u.s.c. § 3651 (1976).
162. 521 F.2d at 262.
163. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd. on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). See also
Currier v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975).
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after she refused to unlock her door at his command. The inspector had no warrant. The District of Columbia Circuit overturned
the conviction, holding that the fourth amendment protected her
from a warrantless search. Privacy in the home was a critical
concern:
Even for the most important laws and even for the wisest and most
benign officials, a search warrant must be had.
We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what his
mission, a government official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magistrate has authorized him to do so or (2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty affords neither time nor
opportunity to apply to a magistrate. This right of privacy is not
conditioned upon the objective, the prerogative or the stature of
the intruding officer. His uniform, badge, rank and the bureau
from which he operates are immaterial. It is immaterial whether
he is motivated by the highest public purpose or by the lowest
personal spite. 16'

The second Justice Harlan reached a similar conclusion about
governmental searches of any kind involving the home:
I think the sweep of the Court's decisions, under both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, amply shows that the Constitution
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion
of whatever character. 165

This significant privacy interest demands greater protection
than the ex parte administrative probable cause standard of
164. 178 F.2d at 17.
165. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). In Poe, the Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use or the dispensing of information about birth control devices because
of lack of justiciability: the statute was seldom, if ever, enforced and the complainants
were seeking declaratory judgment on a statute which the Court saw no rensonnble probability of ever being prosecuted. The same statute was successfully attacked Inter in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Justice Harlan's dissent is also noteworthy because of its discussion of the unique
nature of privacy in the home and how it may be threatened by the birth control statute:
[H]ere we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which
characteristically has its place in the home. But to my mind such a distinction is
so insubstantial as to be captious: if the physical curtilage of the home is protected,
it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of life within. Certainly
the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property
rights.
367 U.S. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
This imal statement - that the privacy of the home is based upon more than property
rights - supports the theory that the privacy interests surrounding the home are somehow
different than the more property-oriented privacy interests of the business enterprise, See
text at notes 179-83 infra.
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Camara and See. 166 Some argue that an administrative search is
less intrusive upon personal privacy than a criminal search. 167 But
rationalizing that there is a lesser invasion of privacy in an
inspection for electrical, fire, sanitation, or welfare violations
than in a search for criminal evidence constitutes a very arbitrary
definition of the right to privacy in the home. 168 Under the present
standard, the suspected criminal's home receives a greater degree
of protection than that of the citizen with falling ceiling tile. 169
The only way to ensure privacy in the home is to require that
warrants for home inspections be issued only upon showing of
traditional probable cause.
Opponents of this stringent probable cause standard may
argue that its use would emasculate municipal code enforcement.170 However, rational study of the problem alleviates many
fears. First, voluntary consent removes the need for traditional
probable cause, and occupants usually consent if the inspector is
not unreasonable. 171 The relative dearth of administrative warrant cases involving home searches, compared with the multitude
involving commercial searches, supports this contention. In addition, most municipal health and safety inspections benefit principally the owners or occupants; they are the persons most likely
to suffer because of dangerous conditions within the dwelling.
Accordingly, the occupant's opposition to an inspection weakens
its justification.
Moreover, to the extent that traditional probable cause interferes with code enforcement, analogies to other areas of the law
exist. We do not practice preventive criminal law enforcement by
searching people at random to uncover evidence of an impending
criminal act; 172 rather, our constitutional system demands a
trade-off between universal law enforcement and civil liberties.
Likewise, the government does not compel the use of safety
belts in cars or forbid the smoking of cigarettes even though a
citizen's decision in these matters may be foolhardy. We tolerate
these situations because the values of privacy and independence
outweigh the suffering that may result from an individual's un166. See Administrative Search Wa"ants, supra note 11, at 643; LaFave, supra note
11, at 37.
167. LaFave, supra note 11, at 19.
168. See note 109 supra.
169. See note 111 supra.
170. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
171. See 387 U.S. at 539.
172. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1958).
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wise decision. Such should be our valuation of a citizen's right to
the utmost privacy in his home. 173
Although dangerous conditions in one house or apartment
could harm surrounding neighbors, those concerns do not justify
a lower standard of probable cause. If the fears of neighbors or
fellow tenants are aroused by evidence of a code violation, they
can report their observations and suspicions to appropriate authorities. If the evidence is convincing, it will provide traditional
probable cause for a warrant. If, on the other hand, there is no
outwardly observable code violation and the resident does not
wish a government official to enter his home, the resident should
be able to refuse entry. Administrative authorities must devise
alternative, less intrusive means to enforce a statute. 174 The right
to be left alone warrants that respect.
173. See Note, supra note 111, at 180-83.
174. Such alternatives are available. For instance, one of the greatest concerns with
requiring traditional probable cause for code inspections of dwellings is the impracticality
of enforcement in multiple-unit dwellings. The worry is well-founded, as violations in
multiple-unit dwellings present a hazard to large numbers of people who may be totally
ignorant of their neighbors' violations.
A solution that satisfies the commercial-private dwelling distinction is possible. Several cities already have ordinances that require the owner of a building to have the
premises inspected before he sells the structure or before he rents it to a new tenant. See
Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138,346 N.E.2d 666 (1976); Loventhal v. City
of Mt. Vernon, 51 App. Div. 2d 732, 379 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1976).
Such statutes can reconcile meaningful apartment house inspections and the traditional probable cause requirement. For example, a city ordinance could require all landlords or owners of residential units to allow a general code inspection of the premises and
to obtain a certificate of inspection as a prerequisite to the sale or leasing of any unit. The
city authorities would have the power to conduct an inspection prior to granting the
certificate if deemed necessary.
The certificate inspection would require a warrant based upon administrative, and
not traditional, probable cause. The landlord would apply for the certificate after the
previous tenant had vacated the premises. The code enforcement authorities, in turn,
would be required to obtain the warrant and, if an inspection were determined to be
necessary, inspect within a few days after the landlord gave notice of vacancy. If the
authorities failed to inspect within this period, the certificate would be automatically
granted, and the landlord could rent the premises.
Note that this arrangement does not offend the traditional probable cause requirement for the home. When an apartment or house is vacant between tenants, it is essentially the landlord's commercial property rather than a private dwelling. During that
period, the structure could be inspected with a warrant based on administrative probable
cause. Yet, at the same time, such an arrangement would ensure that the opportunity to
inspect the dwelling exists at least as often as the apartment changes hands. It is unclear
whether this scheme would permit an apartment to be inspected more or less often than
under present random spot inspection plans, but it does provide greater protection of
privacy than the spot checks while supplying a comparable level of enforcement. It also
provides an additional incentive for the landlord to repair the rental unit for the next
tenant.
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B. Searches and Inspections of Commercial Premises:
Administrative Probable Cause
Searches and inspections of business operations stand on a
different footing than those conducted in the home. While it is
undeniably true that businesses and corporations are entitled to
fourth amendment protection, 175 it does not necessarily follow
that they deserve the same protection as private dwellings.
Even while extending fourth amendment protections to commercial enterprises in See, the Court recognized that more lenient
requirements for inspection were appropriate in the business
setting:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes,
nor do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product. . . . We hold only that the basic
component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
- that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to
residential premises. 178

This distinction is not only intuitively attractive; it also has considerable precedent supporting it. Corporations historically have
been subject to broad state visitorial power. 177 As creatures of the
state, they are not entitled to all constitutional protections
granted to private individuals. 178
175. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); United
States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); In re Lukich,
335 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
176. 387 U.S. at 545-46. In footnote 6 of See, the Court laid further groundwork for
the idea that the treatment of businesses and private homes under the fourth amendment
was not intended to be identical:
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only
after access is refused [as argued in the Camara decision]; since surprise may often
be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will necessarily vary with the
nature of the regulation involved and may differ from standards applicable to
private homes.
387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
177. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946).
178. 327 U.S. at 205. The distinction has been recognized elsewhere as well. In United
States v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 375 F. Supp. 962, 967 (D. Kan. 1974), the court flatly
stated that "[c]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of
[the] right to privacy." In GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977),
tpe Court recognized that "business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may
open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context."
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A broader justification, however, for more lenient search requirements for commercial property lies in the balancing test first
presented in Camara. In a business search, the government enforcement interest frequently weighs more heavily than in the
search of a private dwelling, but the privacy interest of a business
is considerably less than that of an individual home. A critical
analysis of the Court's argument in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
supporting fourth amendment protection for businesses reveals
the reason for that distinction.
Justice White's majority opinion in Barlow's states that businesses deserve fourth amendment protection because one of the
evils that amendment sought to eliminate was the oppressive inspection of colonial merchants' premises. 179 History does indeed
support fourth amendment protection for businesses, but it does
not indicate that they are on an equal plane with private dwellings. Merchants and businessmen in colonial times typically
operated sole proprietorships, and the business shop frequently
lay adjacent to the living quarters. 180 The modern business
concern, in contrast, is a large amalgamation of people and machinery that may itself be a separate legal entity. Moreover, a
modern business may employ hundreds or thousands of workers
and distribute products to be purchased by thousands of people
over a large geographical area. 181 No longer is the conduct of a
business the private concern of a single proprietor. 182 The health
and safety interests of a business's many customers and employ179. 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
180. See A. CoNARD, R. KNAUSS, & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1 (2d ed.
1977). The corporate form of commercial enterprise was virtually unknown in colonial
times. Id. at 604.
181. See generally United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 143
(N.D. Okla. 1973).
182. Of course, that argument could lead to the conclusion that sole proprietorships
should, like the home, be given the protection of the traditional probable cause requirement. However, the results of such a distinction could be arbitrary: Very small corporations would receive less protection than a large sole proprietorship solely because of the
management's choice of business organization. It would also mean that courts would have
to determine when a business affects the interests of enough consumers and employees to
justify imposition of the administrative probable cause. As stated earlier, there is need
for a bright line distinction between traditional and administrative probable cause, To
that end, searches of commercial enterprise should require only administrative probable
cause, regardless of the form of business organization, and private dwellings should receive
the protection of traditional probable cause. Although even this classification is not without borderline cases, see, e.g., United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E,D. Pa.
1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973), it appears clearer than one based upon the
substantiality of a business's operations and the number of people affected.

May 1979]

Note - Administrative Searches

1329

ees severely dilute its own privacy interest. 183 Thus, the government interests advanced by health and safety inspections of a
business are great, and the privacy interest impinged is correspondingly slight. This balance contrasts starkly with the interests of a private home.
This is not, of course, an argument that businesses lie beyond
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Rather, all businesses should have the protection that a nonpervasively regulated
industry now enjoys - that of an administrative probable cause
test. 184 Necessary to this resolution, then, is the elimination of the
"pervasively regulated" exception to the warrant requirement. 185
A strong argument for this conclusion emerges from an examination of how courts have distinguished OSHA inspections from the
183. Privacy interests may be limited in a public setting where the rights and welfare
of other citizens are directly involved. In Public Utils. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451
(1952), disgruntled bus passengers sued the District of Columbia public utilities commission, alleging that radio programs broadcast on the buses invaded rights of privacy secured
under the first and fifth amendments. (No fourth amendment issue was present as no
search or seizure was involved.) The Commission had determined that the majority of the
passengers favored the service. The Supreme Court held for the Commission, stating:
This position [of the complainants] wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment
secures to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government
a right of privacy to which he is entitled in his own home. However complete his
right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare .or rides in a public conveyance.
343 U.S. at 464. The Pollak decision, though dealing with a public area, has implications
for businesses as well. The Court lessened an individual's privacy interest as that individual left the haven of the home and ventured into the public. The same outcome probably
would have resulted in Pollak had the bus been privately owned.
This analysis was confirmed in Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973),
where the Court upheld an injunction shutting down an adult theater even though there
was no evidence that minors had been illegally admitted. The theater owners relied on
the privacy arguments of the Stanley case, see text at notes 157-58 supra, but the Court
distinguished that case on the grounds that Stanley involved the presence of obscene films
in the home while Paris Adult Theatre I involved obscene films shown publicly by a
commercial enterprise. The Court recognized what might be termed a zone of privacy
around the home, implicitly limiting the privacy interest of a commercial enterprise.
184. For the commercial establishment, this is no illusory protection. Although the
administrative probable cause standard does not afford the privacy protection of traditional probable cause, it has at least four definite advantages over warrantless searches:
(1) It interposes an independent magistrate between the government inspector and the
business firm, assuring that the search is neither arbitrary nor capricious. (2) The magistrate ensures that the inspection is properly limited in time, place, and scope, eliminating
the unbridled discretion of the inspector. (3) The warrant notifies the business of the
statutory limits of the search. (4) It identifies the facts presented to justify the search, in
case the business later wants to question the validity of the warrant in court. See note 84
supra.
185. The Court's use of the Colonnade-Biswell exception recognizes this Note's suggested distinction between commercial facilities and private dwellings. The exception,
however, goes too far, abusing fourth amendment guarantees.
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Colonnade-Biswell exception.
Since the "pervasively regulated" exception applies only to
statutes regulating a single industry, courts have refused to apply
it to OSHA because OSHA covers practically all of American
industry. 186 This argument wilts under scrutiny. If a primary basis
for the "pervasively regulated" exception is an urgent federal interest in the authorizing statute, Congress could hardly express
a more urgent interest than it did in OSHA. 187 Indeed, the interest
that OSHA protects arguably benefits many more people (the
whole of the American work force) than the narrower liquor, gun,
or coal mine laws that the exception has embraced. 188 Assuming
that a compelling interest justifies suspension of fourth amendment requirements in certain industries, a similar suspension certainly should follow when a broader statute states an even more
compelling interest. 189 The point is not that OSHA should be
included in the "pervasively regulated" exception, but rather
that the exception itself is unsound.
Furthermore, there is little cause for fear that requiring administrative warrants for inspections of pervasively regulated
industries will unduly frustrate enforcement. The issuance of
administrative warrants based on ex parte hearings will not upset
the surprise necessary for such searches, but it will afford the
subject of the inspection a degree of fourth amendment protection.190
186. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enter•
prises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D.N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F,
Supp. 154, 160 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
187. The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work
situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate
commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of
its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations
and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to pre•
serve our human resources • . . •
29 U.S.C. § 651(a) & (b) (1976).
188. The liquor industry may perhaps be a valid exception, due not so much to its
long history of regulation as to its unique constitutional treatment in the twenty.first
amendment.
189. In addition, the privacy interests at stake in an OSHA search may be less
significant than in a search of a pervasively regulated business. One commentator argues
that subjects of OSHA inspections, which take place in a semi-public work area, have a
lesser "justifiable expectation of privacy" than pervasively regulated businesses have in
locked storeroom areas. Comment, supra note 133, at 438.
190. See note 184 supra.

May 1979)

Note - Administrative Searches
IV.

1331

CONCLUSION

The changes that this Note proposes for the theory of fourth
amendment protection are in no way radical, but they would
better protect the privacy of people and businesses without unduly hampering enforcement of government safety regulations.
First, administrative searches of private dwellings should be removed from the administrative probable cause standard and
placed under the traditional probable cause standard, which now
covers no administrative searches. In particular, the warrantless
welfare inspection of Wyman should be discarded, and welfare
searches should require traditional probable cause since they invade the home. Furthermore, the "pervasively regulated" exception should end, and those industries it previously embraced
should receive the benefit of the administrative probable cause
standard.
This new analysis of administrative searches offers some degree of order and predictability in an area of constitutional law
that has been uncertain for several years. It also has the advantage of fitting fairly well into existing case law.1 91 Most importantly, it rationally resolves the central problem of administrative
searches: balancing the government's enforcement interest
against a citizen's underestimated right to be left alone.
191. The only cases that fail to fit into the scheme are Colonnade, Biswell, and
Wyman, all of which were incorrectly decided, for reasons discussed in text at notes 13147 supra.

